Part I

Religious-Ethical Empowerment through Infusion-Transformation

An Examination of an Established Approach

In the introductory review of scholarship, the infusion-transformation approach\(^1\) to the empowering work of the Spirit in Paul’s ethics has attracted our attention. It entered modern studies of Paul through the publications of the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, who argued that Paul appears to understand the Spirit ‘as a heavenly substance that transforms the human being substantially’, and that such an ontic transformation of humanity produces ethical life as its result (Wrede).\(^2\) Also more recent scholars adhere to this view of Pauline pneumatology and ethics, as the work of Horn demonstrates. According to Horn, Paul is suggesting with his statement that ‘we were all made to drink of one Spirit’ (1 Cor. 12:13), that the Spirit has become ‘the substance of the new being’. This means that ‘Paul... presupposes that the church is familiar with the fact that the Spirit is comparable to a substance or fluid which has been incorporated sacramentally into the believer; it has thus become the new substance of his existence’.\(^3\) Holiness is effectively passed on through the Spirit to the believer,\(^4\) and ‘with the sacramental transferral of the Spirit an ontic basis of the new being is given, from which conduct in harmony with the Spirit is to be expected’.\(^5\)

In Part I of our study the infusion-transformation approach to the ethical work of the Spirit will be carefully scrutinized. For the first time in Pauline research every significant textual datum from Paul’s context (ch. 2) and from his own writings (ch. 3) that has been put forward in support of this view will be analysed critically.\(^6\) It will be shown that both the assumed

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1 See 1.3. for a definition.
3 Horn, *Angelf*, 175; 400.
4 Ibid., 124; 387.
5 Ibid., 388; 298.
6 Some scholars have questioned the supposed physical nature of the Spirit before (see particularly Bertrams, *Wesen*, passim; P. Bläser, ‘“Lebendigmachender Geist”: Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach den Quellen der paulinischen Theologie’, *BETHL* 12/13 (1959), 404–
physical nature of the Spirit as well as the mode of (substance-ontological) transformation\textsuperscript{7} of the believer that is derived from this particular concept of the Spirit rest predominantly on a misinterpretation of metaphoric and symbolic language. In this context it will be necessary to give some space to a methodological discussion of how metaphors can be identified and interpreted. We will do this by examining the prominent example of 1QH\textsuperscript{a} 15.6–7 in section 2.2.2.1. By utilizing the results of our discussions of figurative language for the remainder of chapters 2–3 we will offer fresh insights into the pneumatology of early Judaism and Paul.

\textsuperscript{13}) However, it seems that the studies of these scholars have not convinced the proponents of a stofflich view of the Spirit as they were based on logical/philosophical reasoning and not on exegesis of the actual texts which are believed to portray a physical concept of the Spirit.

\textsuperscript{7} See 1.3. for the definition of these terms. We do not intend to provide a discussion of the question whether Paul had the notion of substance-ontological transformation at all (on this see 4.4.1.). Rather, Part I will focus on the infusion-transformation theory which has the concept of infusion with a material Spirit as its basis.
Chapter 2

Infusion-Transformation through a Material Spirit?
An Investigation of Paul’s Context

Pauline scholarship has rightly tried to understand Paul from within his own context. While past research has at times overemphasized either Paul’s Hellenistic or his Jewish background, modern studies come to see Paul more and more as ‘a man of two worlds’ who was influenced by both Hellenism and Judaism. One reason for this welcome development is the fact that, since the impact of M. Hengel’s magisterial work *Judaism and Hellenism*, it is generally accepted among scholars that from the middle of the third century BCE onwards Judaism came under the influence of Hellenism and thus became Hellenized to various degrees. The present study is also conducted on the basis of this significant insight. Nevertheless, it is still helpful to distinguish between the (non-Jewish) world of Hellenism and Hellenization (of Judaism, etc.). Levine points out that ‘Hellenism... refers to the cultural milieu (largely Greek) of the Hellenistic, Roman, and – to a somewhat more limited extent – Byzantine periods, while Hellenization describes the process of adoption and adaptation of this culture on a local level’. It is to the former of these two that we will turn first in our examination of the claim that the concept of infusion-transformation was part of the ethics of Paul’s context.

1. Graeco-Roman Literature

As we have seen in the history of research, many New Testament scholars who argue that for Paul ethical life is enabled by an infusion-transformation claim that this is due to Paul’s background in Hellenism.

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1 See particularly T. Engberg-Pedersen (ed.), *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), passim.
3 L.I. Levine, *Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence?* (Seattle: UWP, 1998), 16–17. We thus use the term ‘Hellenistic’ more or less interchangeably with ‘Graeco-Roman’. Accordingly, some of the texts that will be engaged with in the following section(s) do not officially belong to the ‘Hellenistic period’ (which ended 30 BCE).
4 See 1.2.2. and the Appendix.
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However, when it comes to supporting this claim, only a few of them explain what these Hellenistic sources were and how they actually came to influence Paul. Nevertheless, it is undebated among classicists that a number of Hellenists understood πνεῦμα as a material substance, and we will look in the following at some important sources that give evidence of such a pneumatology. After that we will ask the question how (and whether at all) this pneumatology was related to ethical transformation.

1.1. The Physical Spirit

Stoicism is the ancient philosophic school that is best known for its (materialistic) pneumatology. Its hylozoistic metaphysics is well reflected in statements like ‘God is mixed with matter and pervades the whole of it’. It is obvious that such immanentism also concerns the πνεῦμα, when the description continues:

for if God is on their [i.e. the Stoics’] view body – an intelligent and eternal pneuma – and matter is body, first there will again be body going through body; then this pneuma will certainly be either one of the four uncompounded bodies which they say are also elements, or a compound of them (as, of course they themselves say; for they certainly

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5 E.g. Käsemann just declares that ‘pneuma is seen in Hellenistic thought as heavenly matter… which has the capacity of penetrating man’s being and, in so doing, to endow with a new nature’. The only ‘evidence’ that he provides (without any reference) in support of this thesis is Hellenistic Gnosis (Käsemann, ‘Doctrine’, 115; cf. R. Bultmann, ‘ζωοκηλ’, TDNT, II, 867). However, as recent scholarship has dated Gnosticism later than was assumed at the time of Käsemann, Gnosticism will not be discussed in the present work. Cf., e.g., E.M. Yamauchi, ‘Gnosis, Gnosticism’, DPL, 352–53.

However, scholars who provide some evidence for a material concept of the spirit in Hellenism include Horn, Angeld, 55–57; D.B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1995), 21–25; T.W. Martin, ‘Paul’s Pneumatological Statements and Ancient Medical Texts’, in J. Fotopoulos (ed.), The New Testament and Early Christian Literature in Greco-Roman Context: Studies in Honor of David E. Aune; SNT 122 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), passim; most recently also Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, esp. 19–22. It should be noted that these scholars frequently do not differentiate between occurrences of πνεῦμα that refer to either the divine or the atmospheric, cosmological or anthropological spirit. This may lead to inexactness in their results, as this distinction was of significance at least for some ancient writers of the Jewish-Christian tradition (see, e.g., Philo, Gig. 26–27; Rom. 8:16).

suppose that pneuma has the substance of air and fire), or, if it is something else, the
divine body will be a fifth substance (Alex. Aphr., Mixt. 225.1–10).

Therefore, πνεῦμα ‘pervades all bodies by being mixed with all of them’
(ibid., 224.14–16). Furthermore, Galen says that the Stoics have learnt
from Hippocrates about ‘the so-called material pneuma [πνεῦμα… ὑλικὸν],
which is analogous to dry and moist nutriment’ (Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat.
2.8.39).7

While it may be an overstatement to say that the pneumatology of the
Stoics has influenced the majority of the succeeding philosophical
schools,8 one certainly finds a number of individual treatments of pneuma-
tology that give evidence of Stoic influence. For example, in Plutarch’s De
Defectu Oraculorum, Lamprias shares the Stoic view of the spirit in his
explanation of Delphic inspiration:

the μαντικόν ῥέμα καὶ πνεῦμα is most divine and holy, whether it issue by itself through
the air or come in the company of running waters; for when it is instilled into the body
[or: mixed into (καταμεγνήσμενον… εἰς τὸ σώμα)] it creates in souls an unaccustomed
and unusual temperament… [i.e.] it opens up certain passages through which impressions
of the future are transmitted (432D–E).9

7 Other passages that may show that the Stoics thought of the spirit as a substance in-
clude Chrysippus, Frag. 715; 1009; 1027; Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. 2.8.48; Sextus Emer-
picus, Pyr. 3.218; Plotinus, Enn. 4.7.4. On πνεῦμα in Stoicism see further S. Sambursky,
Biology, Greek Cosmology and Some Sources of Theological Pneuma’, in J.M. Rist,
Man, Soul and Body: Essays in Ancient Thought from Plato to Dionysius; CS 549 (Alder-
corpusum in der stoischen Physik und ihre Rezeption bis zum Neuplatonismus’, in A. von
Dobbeler (ed.), Religionsgeschichte des Neuen Testaments; FS K. Berger (Tübingen:
Francke, 2000), esp. 198–99; M.J. White, ‘Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cos-
mology)’, in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics; CCP (Cam-
bidge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 134–35; M.V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the
Body of Christ; SNTSMS 137 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 49–54;
J.R. Levison, Filled with the Spirit (Grant Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 137–42;
Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, esp. 19–22. For the materialistic conception of power in
Stoicism, see p. 38 below.

8 See the discussion below.

9 This text gives evidence of (physical) infusion. However, it does not parallel the
concept of infusion-transformation that will be discussed below as there is no connection
with ethics. On this prophetic inspiration, see further Verbeke, Évolution, 268–78; on
further ancient explanations of the divination at Delphi: S. Price, ‘Delphi and Divina-
tion’, in P.E. Easterling and J. Muir (eds.), Greek Religion and Society (Cambridge: Cam-
Experience of the Pneuma: Communication with the Spirit World in 1 Corinthians 12 and
Büchsel, Der Geist Gottes im Neuen Testament (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926), 49–53.
Likewise, Stoic thinking is also evident in the much later Pseudo-Aristotle when he delineates that πνεῦμα ‘means that which is in plants and animals and pervading every substance that brings life and generation’ (Mund. 4.394b). Finally, in some writings of the Corpus Hermeticum a Stoic pneumatology possibly shines through. For instance, in Hermetic Excerpt 23.14–15 God is said to have taken ‘of his own πνεῦμα as much as would suffice, and blended it with intelligent fire, and mingled the blend with certain other materials [ὕλας] unknown to men’ in order to create ‘soul-stuff’.

It is generally undisputed that the Stoic system could be described as ‘materialistic monism’. However, Martin goes much further by saying that within Hellenism in general there was no distinction at all between the material and the immaterial. According to Martin, all ancients were monistic, and the kind of dualism of which many think as Platonic was really developed only by Descartes. Moreover, Martin claims that Platonism had lost its influence from the first century BCE onwards, where after Stoicism became the dominant philosophy.

However, for one thing, the fact that the Platonic Academy as such no longer existed after 88 BCE does not necessarily imply that Platonism had entirely lost its influence on the philosophy at the turn of the ages. Slezák has even stated recently that ‘[n]ach der vorübergehenden Abkehr der Akademie von P[laton] in der skeptischen Phase… erhob sich P[laton]s

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10 Corp. Herm. 3.1b, 2b; 10.13, 17 perhaps evidence such a notion. However, to interpret the power(s) mentioned in 13.9 to be a substance and to say that this substance is the Spirit, as Stuhlmacher does (Stuhlmacher, Gerechtigkeit, 218), seems a bit too far-fetched.


13 However, see Martin, Body, 272 n.10 (cf. p. 115), where he says that dualism ‘was simply “in the air” in first-century popular philosophy’.

14 Ibid., 12, 15. Martin partly builds these assertions on Dillon, who writes that ‘the disappearance from the philosophic scene, after 88 B.C., of the Platonic Academy as an institution is now, I think, following the researches of John Lynch and John Glucker, an accepted fact’ (J.M. Dillon, ‘“Orthodoxy” and “Eclecticism”’: Middle Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans’, in J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (eds.), The Question of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy; HCS (London: UCP, 1988), 103, referring to J.P. Lynch, Aristotle’s School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution (London: UCP, 1972), 177–89, and J. Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy; H.UAN 56 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978).
OEuvre ab dem 1. Jh. v. Chr. zur dominierenden (Mittelplatonismus), und schließlich zur allein bestimmenden Kraft (Neuplatonismus). 15

More important, however, is the question whether modern scholarship is indeed guilty of projecting Cartesian dualism onto the ancient mind of monism. To answer this question properly would mean to engage in an extensive study; 16 however, it will suffice for our purposes to offer a few suggestions that throw critical light on Martin’s sweeping statement.

Martin builds his thesis that Plato was no immaterial/material dualist mainly on what Plato says in the Timaeus, 39E–40A. According to Martin, Plato teaches here that ‘the divinities are material (in our sense of the word) in so far as they are made of fire and are spherical’. 17 Martin’s argument presupposes that Plato understood both fire and what is spherical as material. Unfortunately, however, Martin never provides evidence for this supposition. As it is debatable how Plato and other Hellenists comprehended the nature of these elements, 18 it would be better not to rest an argument for the materiality of the divine on such evidence. What is more, both ancient (see, e.g., Plutarch, Mor. 882D) and modern scholars assert that Plato did have a notion of the immaterial and that he differentiated it from the material world. 19 Plato’s concept of the immateriality of the di-


16 Like, e.g., C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie: eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung (Münster: Aschendorffische Buchhandlung, 1890).

17 Martin, Body, 11.

18 E.g., Leisegang believes that many Greek philosophers conceived aether, light, fire and air as incorporeal and immaterial (H. Leisegang, Der Heilige Geist: Das Wesen und Werden der mystisch-intuitiven Erkenntnis in der Philosophie und Religion der Griechen, I/1: Die vorchristlichen Anschauungen und Lehren vom PNEUMA und der mystisch-intuitiven Erkenntnis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1919), 29 n.1; followed by L. Dürr, Die Wertung des göttlichen Wortes im alten Testament und im antiken Orient: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des neutestamentlichen Logosbegriffes; MVAG 42/1 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1938), 146 n.3).

vines even influenced the late Stoic writer Poseidonius who comprehended πνεῦμα as being immaterial, as Rüsche and Wili contend.\textsuperscript{20}

The statement that the ancient mind could not but conceive everything, including πνεῦμα, as either fine or heavy matter\textsuperscript{21} thus seems ill-founded.\textsuperscript{22} Apart from this, it needs to be borne in mind that we have discussed in this section only those passages that potentially portray a physical view of πνεῦμα. However, a broader look at Graeco-Roman literature uncovers different and contradictory images of the nature of ‘spirit’.\textsuperscript{23}

1.2. Infusion-Transformation

It has already been mentioned that the proponents of infusion-transformation regard Hellenism as the breeding ground of this concept of ethical enabling in Paul. For example, Horn explains in the conclusion to his analysis of the background of pneumatic enthusiasm in the church at Corinth that ‘Die gemeinantike Wasser-Geist-Metaphorik läßt im Taufritus den Ort erblicken, wo das πνεῦμα substanzhaft übermittelt wird und den Täufling in einem magischen Sinn als πνευματικός verstehen läßt.’\textsuperscript{24} However, as Horn does not provide textual evidence for this ‘common view of antiquity’\textsuperscript{25} we will need to scrutinize the potential evidence ourselves.


\textsuperscript{20}Rüsche, \textit{Seelenpneuma}, 7, 17 [but see 11]; Wili, ‘Geschichte’, 86; followed by Horn, \textit{Angeld}, 57 n.6; however, see also E.d.W. Burton, \textit{Spirit, Soul, Flesh}; HLSLNT II/3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918), 121. This return to the Platonic tradition gives further support to Slezák’s assessment above of the influence of Platonism (cf. also Siebeck, ‘Lehre’, 387; Leisegang, \textit{Geist}, 30 n.1; Brandenburger, \textit{Fleisch}, 159).

\textsuperscript{21}On this distinction, see further Martin, \textit{Body}, 10.

\textsuperscript{22}This conclusion has recently been confirmed by Engberg-Pedersen, ‘Spiritt’, 182 n.18.

\textsuperscript{23}Cf. the works cited in n.6 above.

\textsuperscript{24}Horn, \textit{Angeld}, 248.

\textsuperscript{25}Horn admits that the \textit{religionsgeschichtlich} comparison shows that in the texts of the mystery cults the spirit is not conferred on the person to be baptized, and that the
One of the two possible sources for the concept of infusion-transformation is the philosophy of Stoicism. We have seen above that the literature by and about the Stoics clearly indicates that major strands of Stoicism had a materialistic concept of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\alpha \). Hence, the first constituent of the infusion-transformation approach is given. Another presupposition for this concept to work seems to be present too: in contrast to Plato, Aristotle and other ancient philosophers, the Stoics understood the human soul to be physical,\(^26\) so that the idea of an (in)fusion with the potentially ethically overwhelming material spirit might be thought at least possible.

However, the central question is whether these material concepts of spirit and soul were connected by the Stoics to the sphere of ethics. On the one hand, it is clear that it was an ideal of Stoic ethics to live in accordance with both human nature in general as well as with one’s own nature in particular (which is part of common Nature).\(^27\) According to this last aspect, the constitution of an individual determines his ethical life (cf. Alex. Aphr., *Fat.* 196.24–197.3 [LS 61M]; Seneca, *Ep.* 41.9; 94.8). On the other hand, the Stoics ascribed a powerful role to \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\alpha \) in causing differences in things by differentiation of itself. \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\alpha \) possesses the power to act and to fashion matter by virtue of the fact that it is a corporeal entity.\(^28\)

Against the background of these various aspects of Stoic ethics and physics one might suppose that the Stoics really did have a concept of infusion-transformation. Indeed, on a closer look one discovers that the fashioning force of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\alpha \) is not limited to cosmology but also includes anthropology. All bodily sensation occurs as the result of the transmission of impulses from the peripheral sense organs through the medium of different \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\alpha \) to the command centre (Iamblichus, *Anima* 1.368 [LS 53K]). Chrysippus explains bodily tension by means of an image of the spider in its web: if a small insect lands in the web, the impulse is trans-
mitted to the spider at the web’s centre as a result of the tension in the web.\(^{29}\) This physical animation of all biological operations within the human being also extends to one’s feelings and character. Even virtues and vices are different physical states, so that one can say that ethical action is derived from a particular physical disposition.\(^{30}\)

However, despite some claims to the contrary, one only finds very few Stoic texts in which the ethical effect of πνεῦμα is explicitly treated. For example, in his description of Stoic physics, Diogenes Laertius only mentions in passing that the Stoics ‘consider that the passions are caused by the variations of the vital breath’ (ἀιτίας δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἀπολέιπουσι τὰς περὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τροπάς, 7.158).\(^{31}\) Moreover, even what seems to be the only extant text written by one of the (later) Stoics themselves that explicitly connects πνεῦμα and ethics (though not on the grounds of physics) shows differences to infusion-transformation: in Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 41.1 Seneca says that ‘a holy spirit indwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. As we treat this spirit, so are we treated by it. Indeed, no man can be good without the help of God.’ In this passage, Seneca clearly connects ethics to a holy spirit. When he later asks the question what this ‘property of the human’ is, he answers that the spirit ‘is soul, and reason brought to perfection in the soul. For a


\(^{30}\) See, e.g., Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 3.188: the ‘goods of the soul are certain arts, namely the virtues... [T]here takes place in the ruling principle [ἡγεμονικόν], which according to them [i.e. the Stoics] is breath [πνεῦμα], a deposit of perceptions, and such an aggregation of them as to produce art...’. Cf. Seneca, Ep. 106; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1034D–E [LS 61C]; D. Frede, ‘Stoic Determinism’, in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics; CCP (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 185 (citing Philo, Leg. All. 2.22 [SVF 2.458] in support; cf. Philo, Deus Imm. 35, where πνεῦμα is described as the ἐξις of wood and stone). For further discussion, see F. Solmsen, ‘Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics’, in F. Solmsen, Kleine Schriften. Vol. 1; Collectanea 4/1 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagbuchhandlung, 1968), 451–52 (who emphasizes that there is no specific evidence amoung the Stoics on how they related πνεῦμα to the θερμόν of the soul); Long, Philosophy, 162–63; B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 31, 39, 144, 166; Rist, ‘Biology’, 46; C. Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 80.

\(^{31}\) Engberg-Pedersen mentions an additional passage that may give evidence of the connection of πνεῦμα and ethics in Stoicism. He submits that, according to Cicero, Nat. d. 2.167, the following is ‘required for human beings to see completely aright: a particularly strong “portion” of the pneuma of the Stars “blown into them” from above, which will generate the proper tension in their nous’ (Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 21). However, Cicero speaks about divine inspiration (aliquo adflatu divino), and neither the text nor the context explicitly connects this to a physical ‘pneuma of the Stars’.
human is a reasoning animal. Therefore, one’s highest good is attained, if he has fulfilled the good for which nature designed him at birth’ (41.8–9). Accordingly, while there are similarities with infusion-transformation, the differences cannot be obliterated: for Seneca the holy spirit is part of human nature since birth. It is not infused into people at conversion-initiation, enabling henceforth ethical life. Rather, the holy spirit is identified with the human spirit/soul/reason (cf. 41.5–7), as for Seneca ‘living according to reason (the Stoic ideal) and living according to one’s own nature are synonymous because one’s own nature consists in part of a spirit, the god within’. 32

Generally speaking, therefore, Büchel and Keener have rightly pointed out that for the Stoics, the physical concept of πνεῦμα did not explicitly play a central role in their ethics but in their physics. 33 We can thus conclude that the Stoics had a materialistic pneumatology, but not an ethic of substantive transformation that is built upon it. After birth, a supplementary increase or ‘compression’ of one’s individual πνεῦμα through external intervention by the divine is not intended in Stoic philosophy. Rather, cognitive transformation through philosophy and active reasoning played a central role in Stoic ethics. 34 Philosophy’s ethical function is understood as that of toning up the soul – developing its muscles, assisting its use of its own capabilities more effectively (Seneca, Ep. 15). 35


The pantheistic concept of God that shines through in this passage and that is characteristic of Stoicism in general (cf. Cicero, Leg. 1.9.27; Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. 4.5.3–8; Diogenes Laertius 7.158–59; Frede, ‘Determinism’, 202) constitutes an additional contrast to the alleged concept of infusion-transformation in Paul. 33 Büchsel, Geist, 47; Keener, Spirit, 7. However, physics and ethics are interrelated, as we have seen above.


35 This is not just a metaphor but a physical idea, as Nussbaum, Therapy, 317–18, points out. On Stoic physics of the mind, see Long and Sedley, Philosophers. I, 313–23. On the potential change of one’s soul, see Plutarch, Prof. 75C [LS 61S]; Comm. Not. 1063B [LS 61T] (cf. Long and Sedley, Philosophers. I, 368, 385–86; S.K. Stowers, ‘Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosophy?’, in T. Engberg-Pedersen (ed.), Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
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The other potential source that might give evidence for the presence of the infusion-transformation approach within Hellenistic pneumatology is the Corpus Hermeticum. Stuhlmacher needs to be commended for being, as it seems, the only one who provides a reference for the thesis that, like a Hellenist, Paul thought of the Spirit as a mighty substance which eliminates ἀδικία within a person in a powerful act of ontic change, namely Corpus Hermeticum 13.9. Unfortunately, however, ‘spirit’ is not mentioned at all in 13.9 or its context, so that Stuhlmacher’s thesis cannot be verified. In a similar manner, Willoughby claims that in Hermeticism the individual was in a supreme moment of ecstasy… endowed with spirit, a deific light-substance, and equipped with gnosis, a divinely given mental illumination absolutely essential to salvation. As a result of this rebirth, the individual felt himself possessed of such divine power that he could live an upright moral life.

However, Willoughby provides no textual evidence for this thesis; and where he does give references, these are not always translated accurately (e.g., in his rendering of 7.3 he translates νοῦς as ‘spirit’). Moreover, while he uses this text to support his statement that ‘in the moral life of the regenerate, the spirit was given a notable rôle to play’, Willoughby nonetheless has to admit that in Hermeticism the emphasis in (ethical) transformation is on νοῦς and not on πνεῦμα (so, e.g., 4.4–5; cf. 10.6). Indeed, in those places where Hermeticism does mention substance-ontological transformation, this is based on the ecstatic apprehension of the (ἀνευματος) γνώσεως of the Go(o)d (10.6, 9), and not on infusion with πνεῦμα. Besides, unlike in infusion-transformation, the rebirth experience in Hermeticism is a process that requires careful preparation.

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2001), 91), and Seneca, Ep. 6.1–2: ‘I am being not only reformed, but transformed’. While this is a sudden change in which ‘my spirit [animi] is altered into something better’, it is nonetheless not yet complete (there are ‘elements within me which need to be changed’). Moreover, it is placed within the relational context of friendship (6.2–7), not physics. Seneca is clear that ‘the living voice and the intimacy of a common life will help more than the written word’ of books (6.5).

36 On the Hellenistic mystery cults as a third option, see n.25 above and Paige, ‘Usage’, 431–33.

37 Stuhlmacher, Gerechtigkeit, 218. Cf. pp. 221, 230, where he does not give textual evidence for this ‘Hellenistic view’.


39 Ibid., 219.

40 10.9, cf. 4.5. Matter, per contra, is frequently perceived as evil (see, e.g., 10.10, 15).


We have thus observed that, although it has been repeatedly attempted to portray Hellenism as the breeding ground of infusion-transformation, we can merely confirm that Stoicism provided a number of rudimental presuppositions for this theory. However, the chain of argument ‘infusion by a material πνεῦμα results in a substance-ontological transformation which results in ethical life’ as such could not be found in Graeco-Roman literature (at least up to 100 CE).

2. Judaism

After having established that a number of Hellenists were well-acquainted with a physical conception of πνεῦμα but not with the idea of infusion-transformation as such, we now seek to find out whether Judaism provides better support for this approach. As the aim of this section is to investigate those passages that have been put forward by the proponents of the infusion-transformation approach, it should be noted that the results of this analysis will therefore not provide evidence as to what was the dominant view regarding the Spirit’s nature or the Spirit’s ethical work in the different strands of Judaism (on this matter, see 5.1.).

The Jewish sources which are said to give confirmation to the infusion-transformation approach and its presupposed concept of the Spirit will now be explored in the order of their probable chronology and degree of Hellenization. The chief texts, namely the Hebrew Bible, Qumran, *Joseph and Aseneth* and Philo will be analysed in the main body, whereas the Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha and Rabbinical texts will receive briefer treatment in the footnotes.

2.1. The Hebrew Bible

As far as the Hebrew Bible is concerned, it appears that no-one has argued that the Spirit transforms people substance-ontologically because of the physical nature of the Spirit. Nevertheless, scholars have argued that מִרְאָא was conceived as a physical substance in the Old Testament.

Although it was Gunkel who put forward that ‘the real definition of the Spirit’ and the chief factor of the concept of the Spirit in the Old Testament

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43 With regard to the potential reception of Stoic pneumatology in Paul’s churches, see 3.3. below.

and in early Judaism ‘is always that he is a supernatural power’, it was the same scholar who provided the most sophisticated argumentation for the view that ancient Judaism understood the Spirit also as a ‘supernatural substance’. We will briefly look at Gunkel’s argumentation and subsequently offer an evaluation of it.

Gunkel believes that the Spirit is conceived of as a physical substance because it is compared to wind in the Old Testament. In fact, the same term is used for Spirit and wind, which leads to the conclusion that ‘the Hebrew conceived of the Spirit as a kind of wind, more mysterious, more supersonal, perhaps, but nonetheless as a delicate, airy substance’. Why is the wind believed to be a material substance? For Gunkel the reason is the presence of formulations like ‘the “weight” of the wind’ (Job 28:25) and ‘the “storehouses” of the wind’ (Ps. 135:7; Jer. 10:13; Job 37:9). He argues that the underlying reason for the analogy of the Spirit with the wind is that ‘both are mighty in their effects, mysterious…, imperceptible to the human eye, not weighable by human measure, and not to be restrained by human strength’. And, besides that,

the notion of a force without any material substrate requires a highly developed capacity for abstraction which we may not assume the ancient Hebrews had. Indeed, we can say that the more vividly the Spirit’s activities are experienced, and the more lively and graphically he is conceived, the more certainly the Spirit will be taken as a supersonal substance.

Gunkel thus establishes his view of the Old Testament conception of the nature of the Spirit from his comparison with what he believes was the Old Testament concept of ‘wind’. He may indeed be right when he says that the reason why the term נָחַל came to be used not only for wind but also for (God’s) Spirit is to be seen in the fact that those are mighty in their effects and indifferent to human measurements. It is questionable, however,

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46 Ibid., 60.
47 Ibid., 59, cf. 61.
48 Gunkel was followed in his reasoning by P. Volz, *Der Geist Gottes und die verwandten Erscheinungen im Alten Testament und im anschließenden Judentum* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1910), 57–59, and others. Burton follows Gunkel too, but he rightly remarks that the possibility that spirit was an immaterial substance was ignored by Gunkel and his conversation partners, ‘probably with reason in view of the lack of evidence that the Hebrews ever thought of immaterial substance’. Burton thinks that it is neither possible to go with certainty beyond Gunkel’s results nor beyond the observation that the Hebrews denied to spirit the ordinary attributes of matter (Burton, *Spirit*, 58). However, we will demonstrate below that even Gunkel went beyond the boundaries of sound interpretation.
whether one should necessarily conclude that if one of them (i.e. the wind) might be of physical nature, this needs to be true for the other of them (i.e. the Spirit) too.

Apart from that, it is doubtful whether the Hebrew Bible conceives of the wind as a (material) substance at all. The proof texts which Gunkel provides for this view are taken exclusively from poetic genre. However, we will see below (2.2.2.1.) that it is illegitimate to establish a scientific definition of the ontology of the Spirit on the basis of what appears to be strongly metaphorical language. For now it should suffice to illustrate this point from a different piece of Old Testament poetry that also contains ‘cosmological’ imagery:

LORD my God, you are very great.
You are clothed with honour and majesty, wrapped in light as with a garment.
You stretch out the heavens like a tent,
you set the beams of your chambers on the waters,
you make the clouds your chariot, you ride on the wings of the wind,
you make the winds your messengers, fire and flame your ministers (Ps. 104:1–4).

Does the Psalmist believe that God, honour, majesty and light are material objects? And, could the same indeed be said of the wind as it has ‘wings’ on which God can ride? According to such a method of interpretation, however, the wind would at the same time be a personal subject who can act as a messenger. For this reason, Gunkel would have been much more persuasive had he been able to provide philosophical/scientific discourses in the Hebrew Bible that would pertain to the matter under question. That, however, would have proved a challenging task since such discourses are not evident in the Hebrew Bible. 50

Leading on from that, the second pillar of Gunkel’s argument is also founded on shaky grounds, namely on the claim that ancient Hebrews did not have ‘a highly developed capacity for abstraction’ and therefore could

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50 Regarding the OT concept of ἅπαξ, see also Gese’s interesting comment that ‘das Riechen ebenso wie das Luftförmige für alttestamentliches Verständnis als immateriell gilt. Es gibt als Materielles nur Flüssiges und Festes, denn das hat beides feste Ausdehnung. Der Ausdehnungsbegriff setzt den Materiebegriff. Was keine feste Ausdehnung hat, ist nicht Materie. Die Magdeburger Kugeln sind noch nicht erfunden, und die einfache sinnliche Wahrnehmung ist ja die, daß Ausdehnung Materie bestimmt, nicht Gewicht, wie wir das haben’ (P. Stuhlmacher, ‘Hartmut Gese about “Das Alte Testament in der Johannesoffenbarung”’ (University of Tübingen: Unpublished Minutes of an Oberseminar/Sozietät Session, 04.07.2000), 3). This criticism would also apply to Gunkel’s interpretation of the passages of the OT Pseudepigrapha mentioned in Gunkel, Influence, 60. See further Appendix 1.3., esp. n.53.
not but have the concept of the Spirit that is suggested by Gunkel. However, it is Gunkel’s idea of נר נר as a ‘supersensous substance’ (über-sinnlicher Stoff) that is a ‘highly developed abstraction’! According to Gunkel, the Jews of the Old Testament must have attributed to the Spirit something like ‘supersensual weight’. The reason for this is that, on the one hand, on the basis of Job 28:25 the Spirit is supposed to have weight (and therefore is Stoff). On the other hand, Gunkel says that the Spirit is ‘not weighable by human measure’ (and therefore is übersinnlich). However, even a tremendously vivid experience of the Spirit would not necessarily lead one to such altitudes of abstraction. In fact, it needs to be asked more generally how Gunkel can claim that the more lively one’s experience of the Spirit, the more certainly will one take the Spirit to be a supersensous substance. Would it not be equally conceivable (and possibly even more natural) to comprehend the Spirit as a (personal?) power and not as übersinnlichen Stoff on the basis of such an experience?

As we have seen above, Gunkel would reply to the latter question that these two are anyway identical in the ancient mind. And, at least in a certain strand of Hellenism, this is indeed true. For instance, Diogenes Laertius records that the Stoics think that πᾶν τὸ ποιοῦν σώμα ἐστὶν (7.56), and Nemesius, likewise referring to Stoicism, conveys that ‘power (δύναμις) is matter (ὑλή τις)’ (Nat. Hom. 30 [MPG 540b]). While it is thus a matter of fact that the Stoics thought about power in material terms, it is nonetheless unfounded to conclude that ‘ancients’ could not think differently about power or spirit. One only needs to recall the dualistic cosmology of Platonism. However, as we are discussing Old Testament/Hebraic and not Greek thought, Gunkel would have needed to give evidence for parallel conceptions of matter and force from the Hebrew Bible. But this he fails to do.

Finally, to return to the debated nature of Hebraic thinking, the proposal made in the present study is that what Gunkel calls the Old Testament ‘naiveté not yet troubled by reflection’ did not lead the writers to comprehend the Spirit as a supersensous substance; rather, contrary to Gunkel and the scholars of similar opinion before and after him, it is exactly this lack of ‘highly developed abstraction’ that has kept the Old Testament writers from engaging at all in philosophical/scientific discourse about the

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51 This is our own coinage by which we try to capture Gunkel’s thought about the weight of נר נר.
52 Cf. the slightly different statement in Nat. Hom. 40 (MPG 561a; referring to Aristotle): ‘matter is power’. On the Stoic concept of power, see further M.P. Nilsson, Geschichte der Griechischen Religion, II: Die Hellenistische und Römische Zeit (Munich: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 19612), 266.
53 See the discussion in 2.1.1.
54 Gunkel, Influence, 61.
ontology of the Spirit (as one can find it in Hellenism, per contra).55 This proposal is confirmed by Tengström:

The OT does not concern itself with questions about the “nature” of things. Observations of the physical world are registered, but they are always associated intimately with human experience and put in the service of analogical thought and metaphorical imagery.56

On a similar note, Gese argues in his essay ‘The Question of a World View’ that the given framework of the prescientific world view of the ancients did not progress beyond human sense-perception, that is, their world view was constituted by how they perceived nature and the world through the human senses of vision, hearing, etc.57 Gese explains that ‘so

55 This is not to set up the kind of antithesis between Hebrew and Greek thought as Köhler and Boman have done (L. Köhler, Hebrew Man: Lectures Delivered at the Invitation of the University of Tübingen, December 1–16, 1952 (London: SCM Press, 1956), passim; T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek; LHD (London: SCM Press, 1960), passim). Rather, the differences referred to above are highlighted on the basis of a comparison of the nature and content of the literature on pneumatology that was analysed in 2.1. on the one hand, and that in the current section and 2.2.2. on the other. For a thorough critique of the methodology of the works cited above, see J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).


Also Snaith criticizes the kind of hermeneutic put forward by Gunkel when he charges Volz (who followed Gunkel’s reasoning) of ‘the old error of trying to force undeveloped ideas into modern categories’ (N.H. Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946), 200). He applies this judgement also to Volz’s interpretation of Num. 11:25 (Volz, Geist, 23–24; cf. Gunkel, Influence, 61; A.H.J. Gunneweg, ‘Aspekte des alttestamentlichen Geistverständnisses’, in A.H.J. Gunneweg, Sola Scriptura. Vol. I: Beiträge zu Exegese und Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1983), 102). Contrary to Volz, Snaith takes יתנ here as a supra-human power which ‘is not conceived as being material, because the idea belongs to a time when the... distinctions between “personal” and “impersonal”, or between “material” and “spiritual”, were not made’ (N.H. Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers; NCB (London: Nelson, 1967), 230). The passage may hence be best interpreted by a different metaphor: Yahweh took some of the endowment of the Spirit that was on Moses and gave it to the elders (perhaps in order that the seventy might work with Moses ‘in one spirit and purpose’ [so E.J. Young, My Servants the Prophets (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 69]). The elders thus came ‘under the influence of Yahweh’s Spirit, which had been on Moses. More specific than this we cannot be’ (T.R. Ashley, The Book of Numbers; NICOT 16 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 214).

57 In modern natural science, per contra, the limits of sense-perception are constantly violated; in fact, scientific instruments for measurement have taken the place of sensual perception (H. Gese, Essays on Biblical Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1981), 228).
many of the biblical texts are poetic, because it was only in this form that the truth could be expressed. Poetic language brings a statement closer to what our senses can perceive, while at the same time intensifying it metaphorically.58

Against this background we are now in a position to give an answer to the question that we have raised above regarding the validity of Gunkel’s claim that the more lively one’s experience of the Spirit, the more certainly will one take רוח to be a supersensuous substance. Our discussion above leads us to the conclusion that the more lively one’s experience of the Spirit (i.e. the more sense-perception is involved), the more difficult it is to formulate this Spirit-experience in a literal statement and the more likely it is that one will talk about it in figurative language.59

However, modern interpreters often find themselves challenged how to understand such metaphorical and symbolic language. Gese observes that one either allegorizes such language or interprets it ‘realistically in a literal manner, which is as foolish as trying to discover the zoological species of the fish that swallowed Jonah’.60 To apply this insight to the interpretation of the Spirit-language of the Hebrew Bible means that interpreters have to beware of both materialization as well as spiritualization of phrases like ‘the Spirit is poured upon us from on high’ (Isa. 32:15, RSV).61

We can thus conclude that it is a modern misconception to assume that when the writers of the Hebrew Bible describe religious experiences in sensory language they were making statements relating to science. This conclusion should prevent us from trying to conceptualize the Spirit in the Hebrew Bible in such highly developed notions like ‘substance’, ‘supersensous substance’ or even ‘immaterial substance’.

2.2. Qumran

Some scholars believe that they find support for the idea of an infusion-transformation of the believer in the Qumran documents. However, the evidence that has been put forward mainly regards the concept of the nature of the Spirit. It has been argued, too, that the physical Spirit of God fuses with the human spirit, although this has not been linked to transfor-

58 Ibid., 235.
60 Gese, Essays, 243.
Before the first assumption, namely the material nature of the Spirit, will be analysed, we will briefly look at this second part of the argument.

Betz contends that in 1QH 8.22 the Spirit of God fuses with the spirit of the believer and becomes one with it. Betz builds this reasoning on his translation of $db[xwrb br[th ...]$ as ‘before you [...] to mix with the spirit of your servant...’. However, both at the time of arguing this case as well as more recently Betz was aware of the fact that this translation is very speculative because of the immense fragmentation of the manuscript in this place. It is hence not surprising that the modern translation of García Martínez and Tigchelaar offers a very different rendering of 8.22: ‘in your presence [forev]er. [May... not] associate with the spirit of your servant...’, supplying ‘[la]’ in the first and ‘[א]’ in the last gap. One can conclude from these disagreements that it will be better not to rest any case concerning the precise nature of the influence of the divine Spirit on Qumran members on this passage.

Contra Betz, the supposed (physical) fusion of the divine and the human S/spirits likewise cannot be supported by alluding to Josephus, who says that the Essenes believe the soul to emanate from the finest ether ($lepto,tatoj aivqh,r [J.W. 2.154]$). First of all, the soul is not identified with $lepto,tatoj aivqh,r$ (which is not necessarily material anyway) but is said to emanate from it. Moreover, Beall points out that Josephus’ description of the Essenes’ views is in this place particularly coloured by Greek thought, due to his apologetic intention.


As 1QH 15.6–7 relates an ethical effect of the Spirit, the passage could be interpreted as potentially referring to infusion-transformation if one were to understand הדר as a physical substance. However, this understanding will be challenged below.

63 Betz, Offenbarung, 130. Betz mentioned in a private conversation on 04.06.2002 that he would now prefer the translation ‘[may not come an evil spirit] to mix with the spirit of your servant’.

64 Ibid., 131. Also the passages mentioned in Betz, Offenbarung, 134, do not support the claim that the Spirit is understood as a (physical) substance, because 1QS 3.4–9 speaks about cleansing by the Spirit (and not glorification), and 1.11–13 does not mention יוחנן at all.

While it was relatively easy to see that the line of thought depicted above is problematic, it is more complex to evaluate the arguments that have been submitted in support for the supposed material nature of the Spirit, to which we now turn.

The main proponents for a physical concept of the Spirit in the Qumran documents are Betz and Horn. The clearest example of Horn’s proof texts is 1QH a 15.6–7. This passage is particularly interesting for our purpose, because should the author here operate with a physical concept of the Spirit, one could conclude that he may also be inclined to think of the work of the Spirit in infusion-transformation categories, for he ascribes ethical effects to the inception of the Spirit. With regard to the text, Horn seems to go along with the standard translation since he argues that one can deduce a substantial view of the Spirit from the Spirit-water-imagery (‘Wasser-Geist-Metaphorik’) in these lines: ‘you have upheld me with your strength, your Holy Spirit you have poured over me so that I will not stumble’ (15.6–7; cf. 4.26). Betz’ model of the Spirit in Qumran is founded on these two passages from the Hodayot too (and further: 23.9). However, Betz renders the verb הָעַיִם, that is here used of the Spirit, as ‘swung into’, on the basis of its cultic use for wave offerings in the Hebrew Bible. ‘The ether-like substance of the Spirit can be moved, “swung” as the wind moves the air, a view that is caused by the term וָאֹז. We will briefly look at this and other options for translating הָעַיִם.

The decisive advantage of Betz’ rendering of הָעַיִם is its utilization of the literal meaning of the word. Although he was not followed by many scholars, his rendering nevertheless appears to be right. However, while his translation may be the correct one, the inference that we are therefore dealing with a concept of the divine Spirit as an ethereal substance is an unsubstantiated claim which does not hold ground upon close scrutiny (cf. 2.2.1. above).

A similar translation of the line is chosen by Holm-Nielsen, García Martínez and Tigchelaar and others, who translate ‘you have spread your

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66 On Horn’s other textual data, see further Rabens, ‘Development’, 170, 163 n.5. For a critique of a sacramental interpretation of 1QS 3.4–9 as held by Horn, see J. Schreiner, ‘Geistbegabung in der Gemeinde von Qumran’, BZ 9 (1965), 177, and Betz, Offenbarung, 134.
69 Stuhlmacher appears to be the only one (Stuhlmacher, ‘Erwägungen’, 13).
holy spirit over me’. This idea of ‘spreading’ may be due to YHWH’s ‘waving’ of his נῦן. Like Betz’ rendering, the wording of this rendering does not suggest that the Qumran-psalmist had a material concept of the Spirit of YHWH.

Finally, also the translations of Lohse, Horn and others (‘poured/shed/sprinkled over’; ‘distilled into’71) have strong evidence in their favour. Namely, יָנֶה is used in Psalm 68:10 for rain. Moreover, cognate evidence in 1QS 4.21 and in the Hebrew Bible72 indicates that verbs of ‘pouring’ are frequently used in connection with נῦן. Although the translation of Holm-Nielsen, García Martinez and Tijchelaar may still be preferable,73 we will concentrate in the following on Horn’s translation and interpretation because the wind and air imagery has already been discussed in 2.2.1. above.

While the most accurate translation of 1QHα 15.6–7 is difficult to determine, it seems to be less difficult to ascertain that one is here dealing with a metaphor. Even Horn is positive about this, as we have seen. What is not clear, however, is how such a metaphor should be interpreted. Therefore, some light shall be shed on this complex issue in the following section where 1QHα 15.6–7 will be analysed as a primary example in the context of some more general considerations about metaphors.74 Since some observations about metaphors have already been made in passing in section 2.2.1., it is important to ask now more systematically

1) what a metaphor is,
2) how one can recognize a metaphor, and
3) how one can interpret a metaphor, because metaphors will be repeatedly encountered throughout Part I.

2.2.1. Strategies for Interpreting Metaphors (Demonstrated in the Example of 1QHα 15.6–7)

1) Metaphors are a hotly debated field of study among linguists and phi-
Chapter 2: Infusion-Transformation in Paul’s Context?

losophers, so it is not surprising that one finds different views even when it comes to the theory of what metaphor is. Buntfuß distinguishes between weak and strong metaphor theories, a classification that is shared by Soskice and Harré, though they speak of substitution and Gestalt theories. Basic to the former is the idea that metaphor is another way of saying what could also be said literally. However, this traditional view is no longer accepted by modern scholars. Gestalt theorists emphasize that what is expressed by metaphor cannot be expressed in the same way by other means. The combination of primary subject (tenor) and modifying term (vehicle) results in a new and unique agent of meaning – which means that the designation of a word or phrase as ‘merely metaphorical’ is absurd. In the broad line of this strand of scholarship we will henceforth employ the definition of metaphor of Soskice: ‘metaphor is that figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another’.

On the basis of this definition we may infer that in 1QH 15.7 God’s giving of the Spirit (tenor) is spoken of in terms which are suggestive of the pouring of a fluid, most likely of water (vehicle), thus resulting in a new meaning.

2) How can one recognize that one is dealing with a metaphor in a given text? Various criteria for discerning the presence of a metaphor could be mentioned and discussed at this point, but for the sake of brevity we will focus here on the most important one, namely, a ‘jarring deviation from the previous topic of discussion that would result from taking the sentence literally’. With Dawes one might describe this ‘metaphorical warrant’

75 M. Buntfuß, Tradition und Innovation: die Funktion der Metapher in der theologischen Theoriesprache; TBT 84 (Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter, 1997), 3.
77 Cf. Ibid., 290–91. See also H. Weinrich, Sprache in Texten (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976), 276–341, who speaks about an ‘image-receptor’ and an ‘image-contributor’.
79 Cf. 1QS 4.21: ‘He will sprinkle over him the Spirit of truth like lustral waters.’ Cf. Isa. 32:15; 44:3.
80 See the helpful analysis in G.W. Dawes, The Body in Question: Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 5:21–33; BIS 30 (Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill, 1998), 48–55. Further criteria can be drawn from our exposition of the notion of ‘contexts’ in 3a).
81 M.C. Beardsley, ‘Metaphor and Falsity’, JAAC 35 (1976), 219–20. Black further explains that the decisive criterion is often ‘the patent falsity or incoherence of the literal reading – but it might equally be the banality of that reading’s truth, its pointlessness, or
as ‘a certain semantic tension between an expression and its context’. 82

This point is well illustrated by an example from Paul, who writes to the Philippians: ‘I am fully satisfied, now that I have received from Epaphroditus the gifts you sent, a fragrant offering, a sacrifice acceptable and pleasing to God’ (4:18b–c). It is entirely surprising that Paul, as he talks about a material gift, suddenly says that this is an ὀσμὴν ἐυωδίας (lit. ‘an odour of a sweet smell’). Taken literally, this designation would mean that Paul thinks that one/God can smell the gift. But as Paul is writing here in the context of his friendship with the Philippians about a (possibly financial) gift, even with imagery of accounting in 4:18a, we are confronted with a semantic tension when interpreting a fragrant offering literally (as it is to be understood in Gen. 8:21; Exod. 29:18, 25, 41; Lev. 1:9–17, per contra, where animals are being burnt). This indicates that we are dealing with a metaphor.

A similar tension can be observed in 1QH 15.6–7 where the writer thanks God for his spiritual strengthening (cf. vv.8, 10, 14), using in 15.7a

its lack of congruence with the surrounding text and nonverbal setting. The situation in cases of doubt as to how a statement is best taken is basically the same as in other cases of ambiguity. And just as there is no infallible test for resolving ambiguity, so there is none to be expected in discriminating the metaphorical from the literal’ (M. Black, ‘More about Metaphor’, in A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 34). Cf. J.J.A. Mooij, A Study of Metaphor: On the Nature of Metaphorical Expressions, with Special Reference to Their Reference; N-HLS 27 (Oxford: North-Holland, 1976), ch. 2, esp. p. 26; J.R. Searle, ‘Metaphor’, in A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 103. For further scholars, see the overview in J.G. van der Watt, Family of the King: Dynamics of Metaphor in the Gospel according to John; BJS 47 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 7–8.

82 Dawes, Body, 50; cf. 51–52; M. Brändl, Der Agon bei Paulus: Herkunft und Profil paulinischer Agonmetaphorik; WUNT II/222 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 233–35.

One way to recognize such a ‘semantic impertinence’ (P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language (London/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 132) is to review the ‘typicality conditions’ (R. Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition; CSLS 8 (London: MIT Press, 1995 [1983]), 121–22) of the tenor and the vehicle. In other words, it is helpful to investigate the defining characteristics of both tenor (here: ‘Holy Spirit’) and vehicle (here: [something] ‘poured’) and consider whether or not they can be linked on a literal level (for more details and examples, see D.H. Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities: Metaphor, Semantics and Divine Imagery; BRLAJ 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 40–41, 77–79).

In order to identify metaphors it may be of further help to know what metaphors can look like. Of the various classifications of metaphors that have been offered, Baldauf provides one of the most nuanced ones. She specifies attribute, ontological, picture-schematic and constellation metaphors (C. Baldauf, Metapher und Kognition: Grundlagen einer neuen Theorie der Alltagsmetapher; SGBS 24 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1997), 83–84). See particularly her analysis of ontological and picture-schematic metaphors, as the OT/NT Spirit-metaphors fit mainly into these two categories (Baldauf, Metapher, 119–38).
for the strengthening by the Spirit a phrase that is associated with *literal liquid* (cf. the physical imagery in vv.7b–9). The judgment that one is dealing in this (and similar) Qumran text(s) about the Spirit with metaphor(s) is thus confirmed.

Apart from that, in the case of the Spirit-language of the DSS the intertextuality with Old Testament Spirit-metaphors raises the expectation that one is here dealing with metaphors too. The Old Testament evidences such a huge variety of examples of Spirit-language that, when interpreting them literally, it would be difficult to assign a particular concept of the Spirit to each different phrase. For example, what ontology of the Spirit would be implied by the assertion that the Spirit ‘clothed himself with Gideon’ (Jdg. 6:34), and how would such an ontology line up with the Spirit being ‘on’ (Num. 11:25–26; Isa. 32:15; Joel 2:28–29; etc.), ‘rushing on’ (Jdg. 14:6; etc.), ‘with’ (Exod. 31:3; Dan. 4:9; Mic. 3:8; etc.) or ‘in’ (Gen. 6:3; Num. 27:18; Dan. 5:14; etc.) people? As both individual writers as well as the Old Testament in general freely vary the kinds of (mutually inconsistent) usage of Spirit-locutions, it seems that they do not consider them literal forms of language, particularly as they often appear in literary genres where non-literal language abounds (prayers, prophecies, psalms, etc.).

This point is clearly apparent when looking at the expression that God ‘pours out’ his Spirit. While the meaning of ‘pour out’ may be literal (where the object is plainly so, as in the case of water), non-literal usage abounds in the Old Testament, having objects such as anger (Isa. 42:25; Jer. 44:6), wrath (Jer. 10:25; Ezek. 7:8; etc.), indignation (Ezek. 21:31), heart (Ps. 62:8; Lam. 2:19), soul (Isa. 53:12), life (Lam. 2:11), lust (Ezek. 23:8), folly (Prov. 15:2), wickedness (Prov. 15:28; Jer. 14:16), words (Ps. 94:4; Sir. 39.6), thoughts (Prov. 1:23), proverbs (Sir. 18.3), teaching (Sir. 24.33), blessing (Isa. 44:3; Mal. 3:10), grace (Ps. 45:2), praise (Ps. 119:171), wisdom (Sir. 50.27), etc. Against this background it would be erroneous to presuppose that the collocation of ‘pour out’ with ‘Spirit’ is literal and that Spirit thus must be a fluid substance. This is particularly obvious when other tropes used in connection with נִלָּה suggest a different meaning.

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83 Cf. G.B. Caird, *The Language and Imagery of the Bible* (London: Duckworth, 1980), 190, who makes clear that the juxtaposition of a number of different images in a text is a mark of the linguistic awareness of the writer that she is using metaphors.


On the point of method it should be noted further that an a priori decision to interpret every utterance literally unless one is forced to do otherwise does not do justice to the process of interpretation. This becomes clear when one looks at the negation of the metaphorical statement ‘Man is a wolf’: ‘Man is not a wolf’ could be either metaphorical or literal! Only by enquiring the context is it possible to decide for one of the two options.  

3) Finally, some principles for interpreting metaphors should be singled out. In section a) the importance of analysing the contexts of metaphors will be elucidated and under b) we will discuss whether and how one can gain closer access to the meaning of a metaphor by paraphrasing it.

a) ‘Contexts’ of metaphors. Fowler has provided a helpful interpretative matrix for understanding texts. He emphasizes that any unit of communication has to be understood within three contexts: context of utterance, of culture and of reference. We will briefly look at each of these and apply them to the Qumran text under discussion.

Firstly, one needs to identify the context of utterance, the situation within which discourse is conducted. This context comprises the (physical) surroundings in which the communication takes place, the relation of the participants of the discourse to each other, and the channel of communication employed. In the case of a letter, for example, the context of utterance is split; that is to say, the text is written and received at different times and in different places. Most likely this is also true for the Hodayot. The writer of 1QH possibly a/the Teacher, composed and recorded a prayer of thanksgiving for God’s help to him, which was probably re-used at a later stage on special communal occasions, like being chanted at a banquet celebrated by the community or recited by newly initiated members at the Feast of the Renewal of the Covenant. However, as no first-hand data about the context of utterance of 1QH is available, one should refrain from drawing firm conclusions from this parameter for the interpretation of the metaphor concerned.

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88 Fowler, Criticism, 112–13.

Secondly, in order to interpret a metaphor properly, one needs to take into consideration the context of culture. This, according to Fowler, is ‘the whole network of social and economic conventions, all the institutions and familiar settings and relationships, constituting the culture at large, especially insofar as these bear on particular utterance contexts’. Against this background we can agree with Machamer’s statement that ‘we should ask not about the meaning of metaphors but about how people understand metaphors’, because ‘to comprehend is to give structure to the mind by forming a model, and this structure takes its form from our perceptions and prior knowledge of the world, including the social world (which itself includes language)’.

Applied to the interpretation of 1QH 15.7, this means that the comprehension of the phrase ‘your Holy Spirit you have poured over me’ depends on a priori conceptions of the Spirit. If the Qumran sectarians who used this phrase were accustomed to the idea that the Holy Spirit is a material substance (although the grounds for this assumption would need first to be established) they might very well apply this spectrum of meaning to the idiom (as scholars like Betz and Horn do). However, if the Qumran believers did not have such a view of the Spirit, a metaphorical interpretation of the phrase would suggest itself, as ‘by their tensions and collisions certain metaphors continue to call us beyond the literal meaning of words and let their figurative meaning become active’. In this case the Qumran members might have interpreted the phrase on the basis of its intertextuality with similar Old Testament phraseology encapsulating Spirit-experiences, or against the background of their own experience.

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90 Fowler, *Criticism*, 114.
92 Machamer, ‘Meaning’, 257. This point can be illustrated by Machamer’s example ‘e-mail is ruining thought’. One will only understand (though perhaps not agree with the truth-claim of) this metaphor if one can construct a model for what ‘ruining thought’ could mean, and if one knows what e-mail is (Machamer, ‘Meaning’, 260).
93 On the pre-scientific metaphysics of the ancient Hebrew world, cf. 2.2.1. above.
95 These locations may have become ‘dead metaphors’ by the time the *Hodayot* was written. (See Baldauf, *Metapher*, 86, for a critical discussion of the concept of ‘dead metaphors’.)
Thirdly, one needs to look at the context of reference, which is ‘the topic or subject-matter of a text’, in order to receive a metaphor adequately.\(^\text{97}\) On a similar note, Cotterell and Turner explicate that one’s comprehension of a metaphor is enhanced by the availability of a cotext from which the purpose of the metaphor might be deduced.\(^\text{98}\)

IQH\(^\text{a}\) 15.7 is placed within the cotext of 15.6–25, which is – particularly in the immediate cotext (vv.6, 8) – concerned with God’s strengthening of the writer. It is not an academic discourse on the nature of the Spirit but an emotive hymn of thanksgiving. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the metaphor was intended to convey insights about a topic (i.e. the ontology of the Spirit) that is not the subject-matter.\(^\text{99}\) As has been pointed out in section 2.2.1., one would rather need a philosophical dis-

\(^{96}\) It is important that both creator and recipient of a metaphor share a range of experiences because these form part of one’s presupposition pool. See Machamer, ‘Meaning’, 261; Cotterell and Turner, Linguistics, 300–301.

\(^{97}\) Fowler, Criticism, 114.

\(^{98}\) Cotterell and Turner, Linguistics, 301; on ‘cotext’ (or literary context): 16; cf. U. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language; Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 123.

\(^{99}\) Both author(s) and recipients of metaphorical speech may nevertheless hold certain views about the Spirit as part of their presupposition pool. However, these presuppositions need to be reconstructed on the basis of less ambiguous evidence (on this see above).

The same methodological criticism needs to be applied to the way in which Davies quotes Rabbinic sources in support of a similar hypothesis (W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980\(^\text{[1948]}\)), 184–85, building on J. Abelson, The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature (London/New York: Hermon, 1969 [1912\(^\text{[2]}\)], 212–221; however, Abelson can also be read differently: see Hill, Words, 233, 274). For one thing, Davies fails to give textual evidence for the assumption that Hebrews conceived of light, fire and sound as matter. Moreover, also his only case that is indeed suggestive of a physical concept of the Spirit, i.e. Lev. Rab. 15.2, seems to crumble when one looks at the cotext. Particularly the parallel thought of

weight of the wind (Job 28:25) \(\sim\) weight of the Spirit on a prophet (R. Aha)

(1.A–C.), and

measuring of the waters (Job 28:25) \(\sim\) measures of the Torah (R. Yudan b. R. Samuel)

(1.F–H.)

indicates that to arrive at conclusions about the nature of the substance of the Spirit/Torah on the basis of the physicalities of the vehicles ‘weight’/‘measures of’ would mean to appeal to aspects of the literal referents that have no relation to the context of reference, because to comprehend the instalments of the Torah (Scripture, Mishnah, Talmud, etc.) as having the same physical substance as water would be absurd. Similarly, one cannot infer that the Spirit of prophecy has the same material essence as the ‘weight of the wind’, simply because the two are brought together in this allegorical construction. Rather, the main point of R. Aha seems to be that the work of the Spirit is not of same intensity with every individual prophet.
course with mainly literal language to establish the conception of the Spirit that is held by a given group of people. Such a systematic reflection about the nature of the Spirit is provided by the theologian Pannenberg, to give an illustration for what we do not find at Qumran. He uses the modern Spirit-metaphor ‘force field’ not only as a model for how the Spirit works but also for what it is. In the case of Pannenberg we have a writer (as well as readers) whose context of culture clearly comprises the knowledge of ancient and modern physics and philosophy, so that he is able (and willing) to unfold the various aspects of the model of force fields, and in this course he explicitly discusses the materiality/immateriality of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{100}

\textit{b) Paraphrasing metaphors.} We have finally reached the significant question, whether and how one can express without the metaphor concerned at least part of the spectrum of meaning that the metaphor maybe designed to convey. On the first part of the question, it has already been indicated under 1) that this study is conducted in line with the consensus of modern metaphor theorists, who emphasize that ‘no metaphor is completely reducible to a literal equivalent without consequent loss of content’.\textsuperscript{101} Some scholars take this position so far as declaring that a metaphor cannot be explained or paraphrased at all.\textsuperscript{102}

However, there is a more balanced view. For example, Eco argues that ‘if a metaphor has epistemological value, then it ought to be possible to paraphrase it’.\textsuperscript{103} Consequently, while interpreting a metaphor does not mean searching for one unique paraphrase, it nevertheless means searching

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item W. Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie. Vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 414–16. Alternatively, see Welker’s detailed application to pneumatology of the force field model which refrains from going as far as philosophizing about the physical/non-physical nature of the Spirit (M. Welker, God the Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 239–48).
\item Soskice, Metaphor, 94.
\item U. Eco, Die Grenzen der Interpretation (Munich: Carl Hauser, 1992), 212. The exceptions are dead metaphors.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
for principles that will narrow down the choice of possible paraphrases to a plausible set of alternatives.\textsuperscript{104}

With regard to 1QH\textsuperscript{a} 15.6–7, some principles for narrowing down the choice of possible paraphrases of line 7a have been identified in the above discussion of the contexts of the metaphor. We have seen that a writer (and later perhaps a community) expresses in a pre-scientific, Hebrew setting his gratefulness to God in a hymn of thanksgiving (possibly alluding to the metaphorical promise of the ‘out-poured’ Spirit in Isa. 44:3–4). When it comes to finding a plausible set of alternative paraphrases for what the speaker may have wanted to convey with the metaphor ‘your Holy Spirit you have poured over me’, the context proves in this case to be of particular help:

a ‘you have upheld me with your strength’ (v.6b)

a’ ‘your Holy Spirit you have poured over me so that I will not stumble’ (v.7a).

The parallelism of line 6b and line 7a suggests a similar meaning of the two sentences (cf. the intertextuality with the parallelism of Isa. 44:3a and v.3b, followed up by 44:4–5).\textsuperscript{105} One possible paraphrase for line 7a could therefore be ‘you have strengthened me by your Holy Spirit so that I will not stumble’\textsuperscript{106}. However, one might argue that this paraphrase reduces to nothing the emotive character of refreshing waters being poured upon the writer. As an alternative one could therefore propound: ‘you have caused me to experience the power of your Holy Spirit’, or ‘you have refreshed me by your Holy Spirit so that I will not stumble’\textsuperscript{107}.


\textsuperscript{105} Cf. M. Fatehi, The Spirit’s Relation to the Risen Lord in Paul: An Examination of Its Christological Implications; WUNT II/128 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 70. Cf. 1QHa 15.7–8: ‘you have fortified me against the wars of wickedness’ and ‘you placed me like a sturdy tower’. For a detailed structural analysis of 15:6–25, see Um, Temple, 95–97.

\textsuperscript{106} It should be noted that the phraseology of being ‘upheld’ and ‘not stumbling’ is also metaphorical. Per contra, see the non-figurative language of 1QH\textsuperscript{a} 8.15: I look ‘to be strengthened by [your] holy spirit… to serve you in truth….’.

On the justification of the method of paraphrasing that has been applied, see further M. Leelzenberg, Contexts of Metaphor: Semantic and Conceptual Aspects of Figurative Language Interpretation; ILLCDS 1995–17 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), 186.

Once again, some may still ask whether one should not try to carry over the material denotation of the literal referent of the modifying term (a fluid being poured) to the primary subject (Spirit). However, to do so would be a methodologically questionable undertaking, both on the grounds of the contexts of the metaphor which indicate that this aspect does not appear to have been an option in the original setting, as well as from the point of view of semantics. For metaphors in a given co(n)text do not have two meanings, one literal and one metaphorical, but one meaning. 108 This meaning is constituted by the interplay of tenor and vehicle because, as we have already observed, ‘by their tensions and collisions … metaphors … call us beyond the literal meaning of words and let their figurative meaning become active’. 109 It needs to be decided on the basis of the context, which of the defining characteristics of the (literal) vehicle are intended to give new definition to the tenor in order to convey (figurative) meaning. 110 How strongly figurative each metaphor is, however, needs to be decided in each individual case. Some non-literal language may be what Aaron calls ‘ascriptive’ or ‘weakly figurative’, whereas other statements are ‘strongly figurative’. The actual placing of a particular statement on the continuum between ‘literal meaning’ on one side and ‘nonsense’ on the other depends on how one judges the degree of convergence of the defining characteristics of the tenor and the vehicle. In the case of major convergence, a phrase is ‘less metaphorical’ than in the case of minor convergence. Aaron has helpfully illustrated this ‘gradient model of the meaning continuum’ with the following diagram: 111

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The Meaning Continuum and the Relative Role of Ambiguity

As ambiguity increases, so do the resonances of non-literal meaning, until one reaches levels of obscurity that result in nonsense.

Again, we can use Philippians 4:18 to illustrate this insight. It can be attested that the semantic tension that has been observed in the sentence ‘I have received… the gifts you sent, a fragrant offering, a sacrifice acceptable and pleasing to God’ calls beyond the literal meaning of ‘fragrance’. A semantically absurd carrying over of all aspects of the vehicle would be, for instance, to declare that the gifts of the Philippians have the same physical nature as that of a fragrance (unless it was a bottle of perfume, of course). However, nothing in the contexts of the metaphor indicates that this aspect of ‘fragrance’ could be triggered in verse 18. Rather, it is much more likely that ‘in speaking of the Philippians’ gifts as a “fragrant odour” Paul is asserting that they are of the highest worth since they are pleasing to God’.  

Also in 1QHa 15.7 one needs to untie the vehicle ‘poured out’ from those denotations and connotations which are not activated by the context and seek those which are invoked by it (i.e. ‘to ask for the similar within the dissimilar’). The new meaning that results from speaking of the Spirit in terms which are appropriate for the pouring of water in the contexts of 15.7 is constituted by the new insight that is conveyed into how the Qumran-believer was strengthened by God: it was through the life-giving and refreshing power of God’s Holy Spirit. The material denotation of water is not invoked in this context. Nor is a material denotation of wind or air (in the case of the rendering of צה as ‘wave/spread’) invoked in this context.

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112 P.T. O’Brien, *The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text; NIGTC* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 541. Cf. the parallels that 1QHa 15.7 would have with this interpretation of Phil. 4:18 should צה be comprehended against the background of a wave offering.

113 Schart, ‘Gestalt’, 35.

114 On this see further 2.2.1.